Ciberguerra: cuando el arma más poderosa es un ejército de hackers

La ciberguerra ha dejado de ser una excentricidad reservada a actos aislados, a pequeñas cosas. Las nuevas tecnologías forman parte de los civiles y sus ejércitos. Y atacarlas se ha puesto a la par de la guerra convencional.

Fuente: Ciberguerra: cuando el arma más poderosa es un ejército de hackers


The stench of the Iraq war lingers behind today’s preoccupation with fake news | Jeff Sparrow | Opinion | The Guardian

If world leaders can deceive voters about the greatest foreign policy debacle in a generation, why should a president today worry about casually lying about the crowds at his inauguration?

Fuente: The stench of the Iraq war lingers behind today’s preoccupation with fake news | Jeff Sparrow | Opinion | The Guardian


Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet – Schneier on Security

Over the past year or two, someone has been probing the defenses of the companies that run critical pieces of the Internet. These probes take the form of precisely calibrated attacks designed to determine exactly how well these companies can defend themselves, and what would be required to take them down. We don’t know who is doing this, but it feels like a large nation state. China or Russia would be my first guesses.

Fuente: Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet – Schneier on Security


Filtrada World-Check, la base de datos usada por Gobiernos y bancos con sospechosos de terrorismo

La base de datos contendría 2.240.000 entradas con categorías como “individuo político”, “corporativo”, “militar”, “Crimen-narcóticos” y “terrorismo”. Estos datos estarían siendo utilizados por más de 300 gobiernos y agencias de inteligencia, nueve de los diez mejores bufetes de abogados o 49 de los 50 bancos más grandes del mundo. En total, se estima que son 6.000 clientes los que la utilizan en 170 países.

Fuente: Filtrada World-Check, la base de datos usada por Gobiernos y bancos con sospechosos de terrorismo


“La ciberguerra sería una forma de terrorismo de Estado”

El libro pretende incentivar la mirada crítica entre el gran público ante los acontecimientos calificados de “ciberguerra” y alertar de la coartada que puede proporcionar el tremendismo sensacionalista en estos temas a quienes pretenden recortar libertades o privacidad.

Fuente: “La ciberguerra sería una forma de terrorismo de Estado”


Hackeada la base de datos del Banco Nacional de Qatar

Entre los datos filtrados hay información relacionada con agentes del MI6, miembros de la familia real qatarí y del gabinete del gobiernoLa brecha de seguridad afecta a más de 100.000 cuentas bancarias que contienen cerca de 15.000 documentos, con números de tarjeta de créditos, PIN e información personal

Fuente: Hackeada la base de datos del Banco Nacional de Qatar


Qatar National Bank hit by cyber attack — FT.com

Qatar National Bank, the gas-rich Gulf state’s leading lender, has been rocked by a data leak that has exposed the personal details of many of its clients in a file posted on social media that singles out some Al Jazeera staff and purports to identify security officials. The leak contains references to thousands of alleged transactions records of QNB customers, including remittance data to global banks with thousands of alleged beneficiary names and account numbers.

Fuente: Qatar National Bank hit by cyber attack — FT.com


‘Trident is old technology’: the brave new world of cyber warfare | Technology | The Guardian

Forget debates about Britain’s nuclear deterrent. New technology means a country can be brought to its knees with the click of a mouse

Fuente: ‘Trident is old technology’: the brave new world of cyber warfare | Technology | The Guardian


Privacy under attack: the NSA files revealed new threats to democracy | Technology | The Guardian

Privacy under attack: the NSA files revealed new threats to democracy | Technology | The Guardian.

Thanks to Edward Snowden, we know the apparatus of repression has been covertly attached to the democratic state. However, our struggle to retain privacy is far from hopeless

US National Security Agency
The US National Security Agency threat operations centre in Fort Meade, Maryland, in 2006. Photograph: Paul Richards/AFP/Getty Images

In the third chapter of his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon gave two reasons why the slavery into which the Romans had tumbled under Augustus and his successors left them more wretched than any previous human slavery. In the first place, Gibbon said, the Romans had carried with them into slavery the culture of a free people: their language and their conception of themselves as human beings presupposed freedom. And thus, says Gibbon, for a long time the Romans preserved the sentiments – or at least the ideas – of a freeborn people. In the second place, the empire of the Romans filled all the world, and when that empire fell into the hands of a single person, the world was a safe and dreary prison for his enemies. As Gibbon wrote, to resist was fatal, and it was impossible to fly.

The power of that Roman empire rested in its leaders’ control of communications. The Mediterranean was their lake. Across their European empire, from Scotland to Syria, they pushed roads that 15 centuries later were still primary arteries of European transportation. Down those roads the emperor marched his armies. Up those roads he gathered his intelligence. The emperors invented the posts to move couriers and messages at the fastest possible speed.

Using that infrastructure, with respect to everything that involved the administration of power, the emperor made himself the best-informed person in the history of the world.

That power eradicated human freedom. “Remember,” said Cicero to Marcellus in exile, “wherever you are, you are equally within the power of the conqueror.”

The empire of the United States after the second world war also depended upon control of communications. This was more evident when, a mere 20 years later, the United States was locked in a confrontation of nuclear annihilation with the Soviet Union. In a war of submarines hidden in the dark below the continents, capable of eradicating human civilisation in less than an hour, the rule of engagement was “launch on warning”. Thus the United States valued control of communications as highly as the Emperor Augustus. Its listeners too aspired to know everything.

We all know that the United States has for decades spent as much on its military might as all other powers in the world combined. Americans are now realising what it means that we applied to the stealing of signals and the breaking of codes a similar proportion of our resources in relation to the rest of the world.

The US system of listening comprises a military command controlling a large civilian workforce. That structure presupposes the foreign intelligence nature of listening activities. Military control was a symbol and guarantee of the nature of the activity being pursued. Wide-scale domestic surveillance under military command would have violated the fundamental principle of civilian control.

Instead what it had was a foreign intelligence service responsible to the president as military commander-in-chief. The chain of military command absolutely ensured respect for the fundamental principle “no listening here”. The boundary between home and away distinguished the permissible from the unconstitutional.

The distinction between home and away was at least technically credible, given the reality of 20th-century communications media, which were hierarchically organised and very often state-controlled.

When the US government chose to listen to other governments abroad – to their militaries, to their diplomatic communications, to their policymakers where possible – they were listening in a world of defined targets. The basic principle was: hack, tap, steal. We listened, we hacked in, we traded, we stole.

In the beginning we listened to militaries and their governments. Later we monitored the flow of international trade as far as it engaged American national security interests.


A Global Campaign to Monitor the "Digital Weapons" Trade | TechPresident

A Global Campaign to Monitor the “Digital Weapons” Trade | TechPresident.

BY Carola Frediani | Tuesday, April 8 2014

A map from the CAUSE website shows where surveillance technology has been sold to countries with spotty human rights records.

It might seem that there is little connection between Milan and the atrocities occurring in Syria under the regime of President Bashar al-Assad but we now know that a little known Italian tech company called Area SpA was providing Assad with technology that could virtually allow him to seize and search any e-mail that passed through the country. Unfortunately, such an example is now fairly commonplace: Vodafone in Egypt, as well as Siemens and Nokia in Iran, to name a few.

Though Area SpA later announced it was curtailing its surveillance project in Syria, in an alarming trend, surveillance technology companies, many of them in western countries with decent human rights records are selling such technology to countries with fairly sinister ones. This problem, which some activists have called the “digital arms trade” is global and complex in nature and is at the heart of a new global campaign launched on April 4 by an international group of leading NGOs. They banded together to create the Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports (CAUSE), calling for governments to take action on the international trade in communication surveillance technologies.

The group — which includes Amnesty International, Digitale Gesellschaft, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Human Rights Watch, the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, Privacy International, and Reporters without Borders — wants governments and private companies to tackle the proliferation and abuse of these technologies across the world, since they are more often than not used to violate their citizens’ right to privacy, free speech and a host of other human rights. World leaders are responsible for keeping such invasive surveillance systems and technologies out of the hands of dictators and oppressive regimes, said the coalition’s organizers.

“What is unique about the CAUSE coalition are the groups that are part of it,” Mike Rispoli, Communication Manager of UK-based Privacy International, says to techPresident. “You have organizations like Privacy International, as well as Open Technology Institute or Digitale Gesellschaft, that focus on technology, digital rights, etc., but you also have more traditional human rights groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters without Borders. The reason why this is so important is that there’s a broad recognition that surveillance technologies pose significant threat to the enjoyment of rights around the world, not just the right to privacy but also freedom of expression.”

What exactly do these technologies do? There is malware that allows surreptitious data extraction from personal devices such as phone and PCs; tools that can intercept telecommunications traffic; spygear that geolocates mobile phones and can therefore track their owners; monitoring systems that allow authorities to track entire populations; and devices used to tap undersea fiber optic cables to enable NSA-style internet monitoring and filtering.


«Die Schweiz hätte ein Zeichen setzen können» – St.Galler Tagblatt Online

«Die Schweiz hätte ein Zeichen setzen können» – St.Galler Tagblatt Online.

Tagblatt Online, 28. Februar 2014, 10:07 Uhr

 

Zoom

Kenneth Page NGO Privacy International, London Politikverantwortlicher

 

Unternehmen haben ihre Exportgesuche für Überwachungssoftware aus der Schweiz zurückgezogen. Zufrieden?

Ja. Die Schweiz hat aber auch eine gute Chance verpasst. Die Regierung hätte viel proaktiver vorgehen und die Exportgesuche ablehnen können. Stattdessen haben die Unternehmen aus Ungeduld nun selber Entscheide gefällt. Die Schweiz hätte auf internationaler Ebene ein viel stärkeres Zeichen setzen können, indem sie die wachsenden Menschenrechtsbedenken gegenüber diesen Technologien anerkannt hätte. Zumal das Land dieses Jahr den OSZE-Vorsitz innehat.

 

Werden einige dieser Unternehmen nun Überwachungstechnik ohne Erlaubnis exportieren?

 

Sie brauchen eine Lizenz, um aus der Schweiz zu exportieren. Ansonsten würden sie Exportvorschriften verletzen. Einige Unternehmen haben aber Büros in anderen europäischen Ländern und können unter einer Gesetzgebung arbeiten, die ihnen passt. Die Firma Gamma zum Beispiel hat regionale Büros in Malaysia, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten, Singapur oder Libanon. Es ist zudem wichtig, sich nicht allein auf diese Firmen zu fokussieren, da die Technologie oft über strategische Geschäftspartnerschaften verkauft wird.


Foreign Officials In the Dark About Their Own Spy Agencies' Cooperation with NSA – The Intercept

Foreign Officials In the Dark About Their Own Spy Agencies’ Cooperation with NSA – The Intercept.

By 
Featured photo - Foreign Officials In the Dark About Their Own Spy Agencies’ Cooperation with NSAGerman Chancellor Angela Merkel

One of the more bizarre aspects of the last nine months of Snowden revelations is how top political officials in other nations have repeatedly demonstrated, or even explicitly claimed, wholesale ignorance about their nations’ cooperation with the National Security Agency, as well as their own spying activities. This has led to widespread speculation about the authenticity of these reactions: Were these top officials truly unaware, or were they pretending to be, in order to distance themselves from surveillance operations that became highly controversial once disclosed?

In Germany, when Der Spiegel first reported last June that the NSA was engaged in mass spying aimed at the German population, Chancellor Angela Merkel and other senior officials publicly expressed outrage – only for that paper to then reveal documents showing extensive cooperation between the NSA and the German spy agency BND. In the Netherlands, a cabinet minister was forced to survive a no-confidence vote after he admitted to having wrongfully attributed the collection of metadata from 1.8 million calls to the NSA rather than the Dutch spying agency.

In the UK, Chris Huhne, a former cabinet minister and member of the national security council until 2012, insisted that ministers were in “utter ignorance” about even the largest GCHQ spying program, known as Tempora, “or its US counterpart, the NSA’s Prism,” as well as “about their extraordinary capability to hoover up and store personal emails, voice contact, social networking activity and even internet searches.”

A similar controversy arose in the U.S., when the White House claimed that President Obama was kept unaware of the NSA’s surveillance of Merkel’s personal cell phone and those of other allied leaders. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein claimed the same ignorance, while an unnamed NSA source told a German newspaper that the White House knew.

A new NSA document published today by The Intercept sheds considerable light on these questions. The classified document contains an internal NSA interview with an official from the SIGINT Operations Group in NSA’s Foreign Affairs Directorate. Titled “What Are We After with Our Third Party Relationships? — And What Do They Want from Us, Generally Speaking?”, the discussion explores the NSA’s cooperative relationship with its surveillance partners. Upon being asked whether political shifts within those nations affect the NSA’s relationships, the SIGINT official explains why such changes generally have no effect: because only a handful of military officials in those countries are aware of the spying activities. Few, if any, elected leaders have any knowledge of the surveillance.

Are our foreign intelligence relationships usually insulated from short-term political ups and downs, or not?

(S//SI//REL) For a variety of reasons, our intelligence relationships are rarely disrupted by foreign political perturbations, international or domestic. First, we are helping our partners address critical intelligence shortfalls, just as they are assisting us. Second, in many of our foreign partners’ capitals, few senior officials outside of their defense-intelligence apparatuses are witting to any SIGINT connection to the U.S./NSA [emphasis added].

 


EEUU advierte sobre documentos de Snowden con material sensible para otros países – BioBioChile

EEUU advierte sobre documentos de Snowden con material sensible para otros países – BioBioChile.

 

Mw238 (CC) | FlickrMw238 (CC) | Flickr

Publicado por Gabriela Ulloa | La Información es de Agencia AFP

Estados Unidos ha advertido a los servicios de inteligencia de otros países de que los documentos obtenidos por Edward Snowden contienen información sobre cómo otras capitales cooperan en secreto con Washington, publicó el jueves un periódico.

Según The Washington Post, algunas de las decenas de miles de documentos extraídos por el ex agente de inteligencia estadounidense contienen material sensible sobre programas extranjeros de recopilación de información contra países como Irán, Rusia y China.